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1. Introduction 
During the past three decades financial services have 
expanded substantially in rural areas of many low income countries 
(LICs). This has included the funding of a large number of rural 
credit projects, very major increases in volume of formal loans, 
building many new financial institutions, and some mobilization 
of financial savings. The overt objectives of these activities 
have been to increase agricultural output, to ease rural poverty, 
or to offset the effects of disasters or public policies which 
damage rural interests. Despite the very substantial changes 
realized, a few observers, myself included, are not satisfied 
with the overall performance of rural financial markets (RFMs); 
I am convinced that formal RFM activities in a majority of the 
LICs are fraught with problems and that they are contributing 
little to development.l/ In the following discussion I attempt 
to outline and clarify the main issues which must be addressed 
if the performance of RFMs is to be understood and also improved. 
This includes a brief review of historical views on financial 
markets, a critique of the assumptions which underlie many pro-
grams in this area, and a summary of common problems and policies 
found in LICs. The paper concludes with suggestions for policy 
changes. 
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2. Evolution of Views on Financial Markets 
Views on the role of finance in economic development have 
changed substantially. For centuries financial market activities 
were viewed with hostility, and usury was widely condemned. 
Both the Bible and the Koran forbid the taking of interest 
(Nelson). These negative attitudes toward financial markets 
were carried to the Americas as well as Africa. Similar anti-
lender, class-struggle views are also prominent in many social-
ists' works. 
During the past 100 years much of the animosity toward 
banks and lenders in general, at least in most Christian coun-
tries, has disappeared.~/ Initially, this was replaced by a 
feeling that financial markets played largely a neutral or 
passive role in development. It became widely accepted that 
growth in financial markets was a necessary part of economic 
development. Some have argued that these financial services 
emerge automatically as the demand for financial intermediation 
is created by growth in real economic activities (Patrick). 
Individuals of this persuasion go on to argue that loans are 
merely "lubricants" for real production processes. The intro-
duction of a high yielding wheat variety, for example, may stimu-
late farmer demand for purchased inputs. Firm-households lacking 
sufficient liquidity to buy optimum amounts of these inputs 
seek loans to satisfy their additional needs for liquidity. 
In the past 20 years it has become common in many countries 
to attempt to use financial markets to force the pace of economic 
k • 
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development - a "supply led" strategy. Policy makers have con-
cluded that rapid expansion in the supply of financial services 
combined with concessionary interest rates and non-market loan 
rationing, can be used to accelerate economic development. A 
few observers recently have focused criticism on the distortions 
in financial markets caused by this strategy. These criticisms 
concentrate on interest rate policies (McKinnon, Shaw). Critics 
hold that low and fixed interest rates on financial instruments 
retard savings and capital formation, fragment financial markets, 
cause inefficient allocation of resources, and also cause further 
distortions in income distribution and asset ownership. They 
go on to argue that policy makers should adopt flexible interest 
rates which adjust with general price changes, and that this 
would cause financial markets to play a positive role in the 
development process. 
Concerns about the effects of a supply led strategy are par-
ticularly relevant in LICs. Most of the LICs which are market 
oriented heavily distort their rural financial markets. In 
most cases, RFMs are force-fed large amounts of funds by Central 
Banks, and interest rates are set below other rates allowed on 
non-agricultural loans. It is also common for the policy makers 
to fix interest rates still lower on loans for the rural poor. 
Usually, RFMs are more heavily administered, regulated, and dis-
torted than any other set of markets in a country. Unfortunately, 
many of the policies which strongly affect the performance of 
RFMs are built on assumptions which have not been verified. 
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3. Common Assumptions 
A causal observer often is impressed with the uniqueness of 
RFMs in each country. In part, this is due to the diversity 
found among financial institutions servicing rural needs. More 
careful analysis, however, reveals a large number of similar 
assumptions supporting most rural credit-savings programs. To 
understand the current maladies in RFMs, it is necessary to 
expose and evaluate these assumptions.l/ 
At the farm-household level it is often assumed that the 
rural poor face credit shortages, that they pay exorbitant 
amounts for the use of informal loans, and that they need careful 
supervision in order to use loans wisely. It is further assumed 
that most farmers need additional loans in order to adopt profit-
able new technology, and that concessionary interest rates are 
needed on formal loans to induce farmers to borrow. It is also 
assumed that interest charges make up the bulk of the borrowing 
costs foT most farmers, and that the loan demand among most 
farmers, especially small farmers, is very interest rate elastic. 
Typically, rural households are also stereotyped as having little 
or no voluntary savings capacities. 
Several strongly held assumptions relate to lender behavior. 
These include the feeling that informal lenders provide the 
majority of the loanable funds in most low income countries, and 
that formal lenders are tradition bound and do not make loans in 
a socially desirable manner. It is also assumed that formal 
lenders can effectively ration funds by granting loans only for 
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production or by making loans in-kind. Policy makers also feel 
that formal credit should not be extended for consumption purposes. 
Important assumptions about informal lenders are also evident. 
These include the ubiquitous feeling that money lenders regularly 
extract large monopoly profits, charge exorbitant interest rates, 
regularly take advantage of the economically weak, do not provide 
legitimate economic services, and that they ought to be closely 
regulated or eliminated.~/ 
There are also a number of widely held assumptions about 
the overall performance of RFMs in low income countries. One of 
the most common is that RFMs can be closely regulated and their 
performance controlled by administrative fiat. Heads of govern-
ment often feel a need to develop an "aura of action" soon after 
they assume office or immediately after a national emergency. 
It is common for governments to announce new agricultural loan 
programs which include loan supply increases as well as conces-
sionary terms. In a few cases it may also include refinancing 
or forgiveness of formal debts. A number of governments also 
try to offset product pricing policies, or exchange rate policies, 
which are adverse to farmers, by introducing concessionary interest 
rates in RFMs. Foreign aid agencies eagerly jump into this pro-
cess because it is generally easy for them to prepare and imple-
ment agricultural credit projects. 
4. Common Problems 
Because many countries base their RFM policies on very simi-
lar assumptions, it should not be surprising that these policies 
> ' 
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across LICs are much alike. This includes low and inflexible 
contractual interest rates on agricultural credit and deposits, 
major infusions of loanable funds into RFMs via Central Banks, 
and formation of new specialized institutions to provide finan-
cial services to specific segments of the rural population. It 
is also common for governments to attempt to alter the performance 
of RFMs by some combination of policy techniques. 
Two sets of problems tend to be associated with these activ-
ities. The first set includes relatively tractable, and widely 
recognized problems which are often associated with any new bus-
iness: management and training difficulties. There is almost 
always a shortage of adequately trained people to fill positions 
in financial institutions. Slowness in making loan decisions, 
high cost lending operations, data processing problems, poorly 
designed loan repayment procedures, and lack of coordination 
between credit programs and other development efforts are examples. 
As financial markets develop most of these problems are eased. 
The second set of problems is much less widely recognized, 
although probably more important. These problems might be labeled 
"unsatisfactory performance of RFMs." At least ten features of 
this unsatisfactory performance are present in a large number of 
LICs. In many countries these problems have intensified during 
the past few years. They include the following: 
1) With significant amounts of inflation, it is often diffi-
cult for some governments to increase or even maintain the pur-
chasing power of the formal agricultural credit portfolio (e.g. 
. . 
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The Philippines, David). Capital erosion caused by fixed interest 
rates and substantial inflation is often a major contributing 
factor. 
2) Serious loan repayment problems further reduce the vital-
ity of some loan portfolios (e.g. Jamaica, Graham and others). 
In many cases these loan repayment problems emerge in all loan 
size groups. 
3) It is often the case that financial markets resist lending 
to the agricultural sector (e.g. Bolivia, Ladman). In some cases 
changes in the economic environment may cause financial markets 
to retract from agricultural lending. 
4) Closely associated with this, it is very difficult to 
induce RFMs to service the rural poor (e.g. The Dominican Republic, 
Ladman and Adams). Under some conditions RFMs may resist lending 
to small farmers even more strongly than they resist lending to 
agriculture in general. 
5) In almost all cases, RFMs in LICs do not provide a signi-
ficant amount of medium and long-term loans (e.g. Bangladesh, 
Adams and Nelson). The average term structure of the formal 
loan portfolio is typically quite short, and much of the agricul-
tural credit is granted for only a single cropping season. 
6) In most LICs the RFMs are quite ineffective in mobilizing 
voluntary rural savings (e.g. Brazil, Araujo and Meyer). With 
only a few exceptions, formal RFMs largely depend on central 
banks to supply a large part of their loanable funds. Many agri-
cultural banks in LICs do not provide savings deposit facilities. 
. . 
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In the few cases where rural institutions do mobilize financial 
savings, they are often siphoned out of rural areas for use in 
urban centers (e.g. Thailand, Meyer and others). 
7) It is also common for formal lenders to burden at least 
part of their actual or potential borrowers with relatively large 
loan transaction costs (e.g. Bangladesh, Brazil and Colombia, 
Adams and Nehman). Part of these costs are transferred from the 
lender to the borrower indirectly by lender procedures. 
8) Typically, RFMs are badly fragmented (Gonzalez-Vega, 
1976). Each lender tends to service a narrow slice of the rural 
population. There is also relatively little competition between 
formal and informal lenders (e.g. Vietnam, Barton). As a result, 
a wide range of interest rates and borrowing costs can be found 
across RFMs and intermediation by RFMs does not result in effi-
cient allocation of resources. Some individuals are forced to 
consume their "surpluses" or invest them in very low return 
activities, while others must skip profitable investment oppor-
tunities because they lack additional liquidity. 
9) In many LICs, activities in RFMs adversely affect income 
distribution and asset ownership (e.g. Costa Rica, Vogel). In 
large part, this is due to the concentration of most formal 
loans in the hands of relatively few borrowers. These fortunate 
borrowers may realize an income transfer due to negative real 
rates of interest on the credit. They may add to this by 
turning a profit through the productive use of credit. In addi-
tion, borrowers may be able to bid away productive resources 
• 
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from less fortunate non-borrowers. As a result, non-borrowers 
are forced to pay higher prices for resources, or to do without. 
Small savers are almost always denied decent rates of return on 
their financial savings deposits. 
10) Many current RFM policies make it very difficult to 
introduce successful innovations into rural financial markets 
(e.g. Adams and Ladman). Typically, a promising RFM innovation 
is tried on a pilot project basis, but ultimately fails because 
it cannot reduce cost enough to overcome the effects on lender 
revenues of suppressed interest rates. As a result, many inno-
vations in rural financial markets are aimed at circumventing 
regulations. These kinds of innovations typically increase 
rather than decrease costs. 
Common Technique Used 
Governments use several general strategies in attempts to 
alter the performance of RFMs. One strategy includes creating 
new specialized financial institutions to service the needs of 
a specific target group in rural areas. Another strategy con-
centrates on inducing a major part of the financial system to 
provide more financial services in rural areas. This latter 
strategy may include large increases in the supply of formal 
loans, nationalization of all or part of the financial system, 
use of loan size limits, and adoption of lending quotas. It 
may also include policies like loan guarantees or crop insurance, 
differential rediscounting spreads, government purchases of 
-10-
equity in financial institutions, and differential interest 
rates for various ultimate borrowers. A brief critique of 
these strategies and techniques follows. 
New Institutions 
Governments often attempt to achieve certain goals by 
focusing on one segment of the rural population. In many cases 
a target group in rural areas, such as small farmers or livestock 
producers, for example, are thought to have unique 9roblems 
which ~equire a new financial institution to service their needs. 
A supervised credit program, new agricultural banks, cooperatives, 
or commodity banks are often established to service these needs. 
In some cases, especially in Africa, new financial facilities 
clearly are needed to extend financial coverage. There are a 
number of cases, however, where more bricks and mortar in finan-
cial facilities are not needed. Ample financial facilities 
exist in many Latin American and Asian countries; the main pro-
blem is that the overall performance of RFMs is unsatisfactory. 
Frustration over this poor performance often results in new 
financial facilities being built. Many governments feel that 
the new facility will be more flexible, enlightened, and more 
cooperative in helping governments to achieve public goals. 
Typically, however, the new institution is staffed with indi-
viduals hired from existing financial institutions. Also, the 
new institution usually is required to live within rules laid 
down for other lenders. Governments or foreign agencies typically 
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provide special short-term subsidies to start the institution. 
The new lender initiates its activities with a flourish fortified 
by a number of radio announcements and newspaper headlines about 
how, for the first time, a certain group in rural areas is 
finally receiving formal loans. A small farmer credit agency, 
for example, will quickly fill it's loan portfolio with loans 
extended to operators of small farms. In some cases, many of 
these "new" borrowers are former borrowers of other financial 
institutions who have been encouraged to seek credit from the 
new agency. Everyone is happy with the new arrangement: old 
lenders get rid of that part of their loan portfolio which was 
least profitable, the new agency extends money to the desired 
target group, borrowers often receive less hassle and larger 
loans from the new agency, governments feel good about reaching 
the target grooup, and foreign agencies feel that terms of their 
loans or technical assistance agreements have been met. 
Over the next several years thing proceed relatively 
smoothly. Some of the farmers who received credit the first 
year or two have problems repaying loans, but are refinanced. 
As the agency starts to question the refinancing of short-term 
loans, a number of medium-term loans come due, and it slows the 
expansion in volume of loans, loan repayment problems become 
much more visible. At about the same time, foreign agencies or 
local governments begin to insist that the lender do without 
external subsidies. The lender often is given a double blow: 
default problems escalate at about the same time that subsidies 
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are withdrawn. The very existence of the lender is threatened 
unless these two problems can be resolved. Typically, lenders 
do this by rotating their loan portfolios toward those borrowers 
with better repayment records, those cheaper to supervise, those 
with ample loan collateral, and those whose loans result in 
relatively low marginal costs to lenders. The lender goes through 
a metamorphose. Like a chameleon the lender takes on the same 
spots and shades as other financial institutions and performs 
in much the same manner as it's financial cousins. Country after 
country has gone through the frustrating experience of seeing 
credit agencies set up to service rural poor, but later rotate 
their activities away from the original target group. 
Supply Increases 
The basic notion behind using the supply increase technique 
is that if sufficient loanable funds are poured into RFMs, even-
tually some of these funds will filter down to the desired target 
groups. Results from the recent Brazilian experience, however, 
strongly suggest that large supply increases, when combined with 
concessionary interest rates, may not reach a large majority of 
the rural residents. Adams and Tommy report that very little 
of the three-fold real increase in formal credit in Brazil over 
the 1965-1969 period filtered down to small or new borrowers in 
one area of Southern Brazil. Out of a total of 338 representative 
farmers surveyed, they report that 11 of the largest farmers 
received over two-thirds of the increase in volume of formal loans 
-13-
made to all 338 farmers over the 1965-1969 period. Because of 
the negative real rates of interest in Brazil, borrowers who 
have access to the "sweet money" want very large amounts. Lenders, 
at the same time, have strong incentives to concentrate loans 
in the hands of borrowers who have substantial wealth, experience 
with the lender, secure collateral, and who will take large loans 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1976). The net result is that very little of 
the increased supply of cheap loans filters down to small and 
new borrowers, despite major increases in credit supply. 
Nationalization 
Several countries including India, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, 
Sri Lanka and Afghanistan have nationalized part of all of their 
formal rural financial markets in an attempt to more directly 
influence their performance. Fragmentary evidence, especially 
from Bangladesh, Costa Rica and India, suggests that nationali-
zation may have a weaker effect on lender behavior than many 
policy makers had hoped (Rahim, Gonzalez-Vega, 1973, Shetty). 
It is relatively easy to draw up regulations for a financial 
system, but difficult to enforce these regulations where decision 
makers affected by these regulations are widely disbursed. In 
market economies it appears to make little difference whether 
lenders are private, mixed, or publicly owned; managers are 
judged by the amount of economic surplus they generate. 
" 
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Loan Size Limits 
A few countries have used loan size limits in an attempt 
to force lenders to alter the make-up of their loan portfolios. 
These limits often specify a maximum size loan. The policy 
maker assumes that these limits will force lenders to direct 
part of their lending to new, more socially desirable activities. 
Unfortunately, loan size limits are often ineffective in forcing 
lenders to alter loan portfolios. If lenders reduce the number 
of large loans in their portfolio, while adding more small 
loans, they will often experience a substantial increase in 
lending costs. To avoid this, lenders may meet the letter of 
the loan size regulation, but evade the spirit, by making multi-
ple small loans to former borrowers of large amounts. 
Lending Quotas 
Most LICs use some form of lending quota as a way of allo-
cating loanable funds among sectors of the economy, among 
lenders, and among ultimate borrowers. At a sectoral level, 
governments may impose certain minimum percentages or amounts 
which institutions must lend to certain sectors. For example, 
currently in Thailand all commercial banks are required to lend 
a minimum of 11 percent of their loan portfolio for agricultural 
purposes. In Colombia, banks must lend a minimum of 15 percent 
of all their loans to agriculture. At the lender level, regula-
tions may state that a certain part of the loan portfolio must 
go to a specific target group. In the Philippines, for example, 
.. 
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banks at one time were required to lend a minimum of 10 percent 
of their new loans to agrarian reform participants. At the 
borrower level it is common for lenders to allocate credit on 
the basis of so many units of money for each unit of land in a 
given crop. 
There are at least three major drawbacks to these loan 
quotas. The first is that lenders may simply redefine loans 
to meet new loan quota regulations or lenders may ignore the 
credit plan altogether (Vogel and Larson). Lenders may be able 
to redefine a sufficient number of their loans and meet quota 
requirements without changing the real pattern of their lending. 
The second disadvantage emerges when quotas are in fact effective 
in changing real portfolio make-up. Some specialized lenders 
may find it difficult to effectively place and administer loans 
outside their areas of specialization. A third disadvantage 
results from fixed loan quotas for individual farmers. Some 
farmers may have profitable investment opportunities which are 
much larger than their loan quota. Other borrowers may find 
their loan quotas far exceed their additional liquidity needs. 
Loan Guarantees 
A number of countries including Mexico, Peru, the Philippines 
and Sri Lanka, have used loan guarantees or crop insurance to 
alter lender and borrower behavior. Loan guarantees transfer 
part of the risks and uncertainties of lending from one agency 
to another agency. The most serious disadvantage of these 
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guarantees is the administrative difficulties of assessing, 
in a timely manner, the legitimacy of claims. Agricultural 
disasters may affect large numbers of producers in very short 
periods of time. It is very difficult, for example, to correctly 
access massive and widespread crop damage from hurricanes or 
typhoon~ with±n several weeks after they happen. Loan guarantee 
programs, as a result, are costly and cumbersome to administer. 
Rediscount Spreads 
One of the most widely used techniques in LICs for altering 
lender behavior is preferential rediscount spreads. A major part 
of foreign capital assistance for RFMs in LICs flows through 
these mechanisms. Operationally the technique is very simple. 
A central bank may offer to rediscount loans made for selected 
purposes at rates much lower than normal rediscount rates. This 
provides lenders with a wider spread between rates paid for loan-
able funds and rates which can be charged to the ultimate bor-
rower. If the spreads are wide enough, this technique can be 
very powerful in inducing lenders to rediscount certain kinds 
of loans with central banks. 
This technique has several serious weaknesses, however. 
The first is that rediscounting certain types of loans with 
central banks may not result in much additional lending in the 
desired direction. Because of fungibility, for example, a lender 
may rediscount most of its small farmer loans and use the addi-
tional loanable funds to expand lending to large borrowers. 
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The second and more serious weakness in this technique is 
that it may sharply reduce the incentives for lenders to mobilize 
part of their loanable funds through savings deposits. In all 
too many cases lenders get funds from central banks through 
rediscount mechanisms at lower rates than they must pay for 
voluntary household deposits. 
Differential Interest Rates 
Many countries apply interest rates to agricultural loans 
which are lower than regular commercial rates. As mentioned 
earlier, it is also common for policy makers to assign interest 
rate limits on small farmer loans, or loans for special devel-
opment projects which are lower than regular agricultural loans. 
Other things being equal, these lower interest rates discourage 
lenders from servicing the very target group or sector stressed 
by the policy maker. Why should a lender be excited about 
lending to small farmers at 8 percent when they can lend to 
others at higher rates? Typically, the concessionary priced 
loan is aimed at a target group which has been difficult for 
lenders to service. Often, the lenders' costs of servicing 
this group are hgher than is true of other borrowers. The low 
interest rates, combined with higher costs, give lenders double 
disincentives to evade lending to the intended target group. 
.. 
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6. Policy Suggestions 
Not all observers are convinced that RFMs are performing poorly. 
Researchers still have a good deal of work to do in carefully 
documenting and explaining the recent performance of RFMs. Further, 
cynics argue that RFMs are very effective in doing what policy 
makers really want done. They argue that covert objectives are 
to buy and maintain political support from powerful people in 
the society. It is for this reason that the benefits from cur-
rent RFM policies flow to elites. As Lipton has pointed out, 
this may result from a convergence of interests on the part of 
beneficiaries and policy makers rather than from outright con-
spiracy (Lipton, p. 19). Cheap credit and lax loan recovery 
procedures are part of the system to buy "big votes" in the 
society. The ease of expanding loan portfolios and manipulating 
interest rates makes RFMs a very seductive political tool. If 
the cynics are correct, neo-classical economists have little 
useful to say about recent events in RFMs; Marxian tools of 
analysis are more appropriate. 
It is too early for me to join the cynics camp, but after 
working on RFM issues in more than a dozen LICs, I am convinced 
that most RFMs are not helping these countries to realize pub-
lically stated objectives. The adverse effects of rapidly ex-
panding RFM activities on income distribution, resource allo-
cation a~d capital formation are too serious to be ignored or 
excused. It is also clear to me that this poor performance is 
the result of faulty policies based on incorrect assumptions. 
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I continue to hope that these faulty policies will be changed if 
policy makers are clearly shown the inconsistencies between cur-
rent policies and overt public objectives. 
Policy makers and researchers need to reassess the role 
which RFMs should play in the development process. I feel that 
major changes in how RFMs are used are long overdue. Some of 
these changes include the following: 
a. Policies and programs which stress mobilization of 
voluntary financial savings in Pural areas should be 
initiated. These policies should include strong 
incentives for households to save in financial forms, 
as well as providing convenient and inexpensive ways 
for households to hold their savings. Initially, 
savings mobilization and not credit allocation should 
be the top priority for RFMs. 
b. Flexible, nominal interest rate policies should be 
adopted which allow RFMs to charge and pay positive 
real rates of interest on agricultural loans and 
savings deposits. 
c. Interest rate policies plus other incentives should 
be used to induce a major portion of the financial 
market in a country to service rural financial needs. 
d. Much less emphasis should be placed on allocating 
loanable funds among sectors, lenders, and borrowers 
by administrative fiats. Market forces and realistic 
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prices in RFMs should be the main way of forcing 
lenders, borrowers, and savers to act in ways con-
sistent with efficiency, equity, and development 
goals in market economies. 
e. Much less attention should be focused on conces-
sionary interest rates as a way of inducing small 
farmers to use formal credit. Instead, attention 
should focus on reducing borrowers' loan transaction 
costs. Concessionary interest rates have a strong 
adverse impact on the willingness of lenders to 
service agriculture in general and small farmers in 
particular. Higher rates would help to overcome 
this problem and would have little effect on loan 
demand among small and new borrowers. 
f. If monopoly profits exist in informal RFMs, conces-
sionary interest rates on formal credit, even with 
large credit supply increases, will not cure this 
problem. Higher interest rates on formal credit 
would induce formal lenders to compete away part or 
all of these monopoly profits. 
Critics might argue that these policy suggestions ignore 
political realities, and that concessionary priced credit is 
needed to buy widespread political support in rural areas. It 
seems to me that this view overlooks a very important point; low 
interest rates on credit force governments and lenders to set 
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even lower rates on financial deposits. In most societies, en-
lightened policies could result in a larger number of people 
holding savings deposits than the number receiving credit. As 
a result, in reasonably democratic societies, higher interest 
rates on1 savings deposits may elicit more widespread political 
I 
I 
support than is lost by higher rates on credit. Higher interest 
rates on credit may result in expanded opportunities for small 
farmers to get formal loans at lower total borrowing costs. If 
the above holds, the net political effect of flexible and 
generally higher interest rates on formal financial activities 
in rural areas may be to influence positively more, rather than 
less, votes for governments in power. 
The changes in RFM policies suggested here will be no panacea 
for low income countries. Other commonly used development tech-
niques such as technological change, improvements in water con-
trol, land reform, investments in infrastructure, and appropriate 
pricing policies must be front and center in most rural develop-
ment programs. At best, RFMs play only a supporting role in these 
activities. I feel that too many of the current RFM policies 
and received wisdom on this topic are of "Dark Age'' vintage, and 
that it is time to drag rural financial market policies into the 
20th Century. 
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FOOTNOTES 
The Office of Rural Development and Development Administration, 
Agency for International Development provided support for the 
preparation of this paper. I have also benefited greatly from 
comments made by colleagues in the Agricultural Finance Program 
at The Ohio State University. The Agency and my colleagues 
may not want to be branded, however, with some of the ideas 
expressed in this article. 
For a review of these problems see the various papers prepared 
for the A.I.D. Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit sponsored 
by the Agency for International Development. A summary of 
many of the points made in these papers can be found in 
Donald's book. 
The recent reversion to strict Islamic Laws on interest payments 
in several Islamic countries, and the blowing up of the Central 
Bank in Kampuchea suggests that a good deal of latent animosity 
still lingers about. 
}/ These assumptions can be found scattered in most of the liter-
ature on agricultural finance in LICs published in the 1950s 
and 1960s. For example, see Belshaw and Bauer. 
ii These views are especially prominent in literature which 
treats Pakistan, India or Bangladesh. 
